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Abstract 
 
Political participation is one of the most studied aspects of the contemporary development of 
western democracies (Ekman & Amnå, 2012; van Deth, 2014). A recent trend focuses the lack 
of political participation among younger generations (e.g., Henn, Weinstein & Forrest, 2005; 
Kimberlee, 2002). At the same time, the last decades have also witnessed a growth in the share 
of young European Union (EU) citizens who express alienation, and distrust toward social and 
political institutions at the national as well as the European level (Dalton, 1998; Henn et al., 
2005; Mierina, 2014).  By studying young people across different countries of the EU, the 
current study aims to examine if youths’ political passivity is better explained by political apathy 
or alienation. Our analyses are based on a comparative survey data collected by the Catch-EyoU 
project comprising approximately 4,454 late adolescents assembled from eight member countries 
of the EU. Results from logistic regressions predicting non-voting from apathy and alienation 
support the idea that political passivity is best understood as the result of political apathy. 
Moreover, it seems that the underlying separator of apathetic and alienated youths is cognitive 
awareness of political life. These results are discussed in relation to potentially built-in 
paradoxes of apathy present in efficient and well-functional welfare-state democracies. 
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Apathy or Alienation? Political Passivity among Youths across Eight European Union Countries 
 
 
Political participation is one of the most studied aspects of the contemporary development of 
western democracies (Ekman & Amnå, 2012; van Deth, 2014). A recent trend in research on 
this topic focuses on the lack of political participation and its explanations among younger 
generations (e.g., Henn, Weinstein & Forrest, 2005; Kimberlee, 2002). From this research it is 
notable that the last decades have witnessed a growth in the share of young European Union 
(EU) citizens who express alienation and distrust toward social and political institutions at the 
national as well as the European level (Henn et al., 2005; Mierina, 2014). Concerned with this 
development, Norris (2003, p. 2) argued that: “Political disengagement is thought to affect all 
citizens but young people are believed to be particularly disillusioned about the major 
institutions of representative democracy, leaving them either apathetic (at best) or alienated (at 
worst).” 
Many studies on this topic label young people as either politically active or passive. 
 
However, such a dichotomy is likely a simplification as a seemingly passive stance can actually 
mask a latent political involvement (e.g., Amnå & Ekman, 2014). This is important as it shows 
that, although it may be that Norris’ depiction of young people is applicable in many places of 
the world, to assume that political passivity has the same meaning and consequence across 
contexts is likely a misguided presumption (Fox, 2015). In light of these puzzles concerning 
political passivity, this study aims to deepen the knowledge about political passivity by 
examining whether it is explained better by political apathy or alienation. 
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Previous research on political apathy and alienation 
 
Political apathy and alienation 
 
Some 60 years ago, Dean (1960, p. 187) claimed that political apathy is usually “defined simply 
as voting or nonvoting,” referring, naturally, to the inactive deed in this dichotomy. In a similar 
vein, understanding political apathy as a lack of involvement in political participation is also 
common in contemporary research (O’Toole, Lister, Marsh, Jones & McDonagh, 2003; 
Cammaerts, Bruter, Banaji, Harrison & Anstead, 2014). In contrast to such definitions however, 
we follow the logic of Fox (2015) and define political apathy as lack of a desire, or motive, to 
take an interest in politics. This means that apathy is understood exclusively as an attitudinal 
orientation not to be confounded with a lack of political participation. This approach to political 
apathy opens for the possibility to examine also behavioral consequences of an indifferent stance 
toward politics. Stated differently, with this approach we can examine the extent to which 
political apathy explains young people’s political passivity. 
In general, the average level of political apathy seems to be very stable (Prior, 2010). 
 
Using several databases of general populations to examine the development of political interest, 
Prior showed that in general, the aggregate level of political interest does not change very much 
over time, irrespective of context. With regard to young people, however, research shows a 
different picture. Political apathy seems more widespread among younger generations and 
youths’ political apathy is more pronounced nowadays compared to previously (Bennett, 2000; 
Henn et al., 2005). 
Turning to political alienation, Lane (1962, p. 161) stated that it refers to “a person’s 
sense of estrangement from the politics and government of his[/her] society.” A common way to 
conceptualize political alienation is to extract it into four dimensions: powerlessness, 
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normlessness, meaninglessness, and isolation (Finifter, 1970). Because the latter two seem to be 
empirical unrealities (Finifter, 1970; Fox, 2015), and thereby foremost of theoretical value, this 
study focuses on powerlessness and normlessness. Political powerlessness reflects “an 
individual’s feeling that [s]/he cannot affect the actions of the government… [and that] the heart 
of the political process…is not subject to his[/her] influence” (Finifter, 1970, p. 390). Political 
normlessness, in turn, refers to “the individual’s perception that the norms and rules intended to 
govern political relations have broken down, and that departures from prescribed behavior are 
common” (Finifter, 1970, p. 390). 
Much research has addressed the political alienation of young people. Amongst other 
things, some scholars have claimed that political alienation may be superior to political apathy in 
explaining young peoples’ non-voting (Henn et al., 2005). Additionally, when it comes to the 
underpinnings of political alienation, Gniewosz, Noack and Buhl (2009) showed that both 
parents and school ought to have important roles for the development of political alienation 
among young people. Their study assessed the powerlessness dimension of political alienation 
and found that parents’ political alienation as well as more transparent teaching techniques could 
explain variations in young peoples’ evaluations of citizens’ influence on public affairs. 
There seems to be both similarities and differences between political apathy and 
alienation. Conceptually, Fox (2015) argues that both political apathy and alienation are 
relatively stable political orientations, best understood as continuums. But these similarities 
must not lead to a mix-up of the two concepts, as unfortunately sometimes have been the case 
(e.g., Farthing, 2010). Their similarities aside, the extent to which apathy and alienation are 
related is contested. For instance, Neuman (1957, p. 290) posits that political alienation is a 
“conscious rejection of the whole political system which expresses itself in apathy.” In similar 
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vein, early investigations of the concepts found political alienation to be positively related to 
political apathy (Dean, 1960). However, the low magnitude of their correlation led the author to 
conclude that the two should be understood as distinct concepts. A crucial aspect that differs 
between the two is that alienation is an active orientation with a strong sense of cognitive 
awareness (Fox, 2015). That is, compared with apathetic, alienated individuals are more aware 
of what it is that they are alienated from. By comparison, the cognitive awareness of apathetic 
individuals is very low and apathetic individuals know only enough about politics to tell that 
politics is not in their interest. 
Predicting political passivity 
 
The cognitive-awareness differences of political apathy and alienation suggest that the two also 
have different behavioral consequences. Behavioral consequences for apathy are “less the direct 
consequences of an active orientation than the reflection of a lack of motivation to do anything 
else […]: higher levels of apathy imply lower levels of motivation […], which in turn implies 
lower levels of political participation” (Fox, 2015, p. 153). The likelihood to vote for individuals 
expressing high levels of political apathy is therefore low. With regard to behavioral 
consequences of alienation, scholars anticipate that politically alienated individuals might act in 
one of the following two ways: 1) exit the scene, and 2) take remedial action (Hirschman, 1970). 
Hence, alienation may result in individuals exiting the scene by refusing to vote, or, choosing to 
voice discontent by using for instance unconventional political means. In sum, the overarching 
question of this study addresses whether young people’s abstention from voting is foremost due 
to apathy or alienation. Consequently, we asked the following research question: 
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Is political apathy or alienation better at explaining political passivity among youths in 
the European Union? 
 
 
Method 
 
Participants and procedure. 
 
For this study, we use the first wave of the comparative survey of youths collected in 2017 in 
eight EU countries by the Catch-EyoU project1. The data comprise survey answers from 4454 
youth collected in the Czech Republic (n = 528), Estonia (n = 571), Germany (n = 647), Greece 
(n = 476), Italy (n = 814), Portugal (n = 465), Sweden (n = 400), and the United Kingdom (n = 
553). The selected countries thereby target new and old EU member states, countries with 
different welfare regimes, Nordic, central European, and Southern European countries. Beyond 
this diversity, participants were strategically chosen to represent societal diversity throughout 
the EU. The data collections therefore aimed to target both boys and girls with varying social 
and ethnic backgrounds. Most countries collected their data in school. The extent to which the 
collected data equate with national averages on relevant factors varied greatly across countries. 
In general, females are overrepresented in the sample. For this study, the analytic sample 
comprised young people within the 14–20 age-range, enrolled in both vocational and academic 
programs (N = 4 454; 56.2% girls; Mage = 16.56; SD = 1.09). 
The data were collected using both paper (67%) and online (33%) questionnaires. 
Participants were informed about the types of questions included in the questionnaire, the 
amount of time to finish, and that their participation was voluntary. Participants were also 
guaranteed that their answers would not be seen by parents, teachers, or anyone else. When 
collected in school, teachers were not present. 
YOUTH POLITICAL PASSIVITY IN THE EU 9 
 
Measures 
 
Political apathy. We used three questions asking about youths’ political interest to assess 
their political apathy: “How interested are you in politics?” “How interested are you in what is 
going on in society?”, and “How interested are you in European Union related topics?” From 
these questions we created a scale of youths’ political apathy (Cronbach’s αrange = 0.78–0.86). 
The response scale for all three questions was inverted so as to measure apathy: 1 “Extremely 
interested” to 5 “Not interested at all.” 
Political alienation. We measured two dimensions of political alienation. Powerlessness 
was measured with the stem question: “How much do you agree or disagree with the following?” 
We assessed powerlessness with four statements: “People like me do not have opportunities to 
influence the decisions of the European Union,” “It does not matter who wins the European 
elections, the interests of ordinary people do not matter,” “People like me do not have 
opportunities to influence the decisions of the national parliament,” and “It does not matter who 
wins the [country’s] elections, the interests of ordinary people do not matter.”  Respondents 
could answer from 1 “Strongly disagree” to 5 “Strongly agree.” These items were averaged into 
a powerlessness index (Cronbach’s αrange = 0.69–0.87). 
Due to its close relation to political trust, and in concordance with prior research (e.g., 
Fox, 2015), this study used items measuring institutional trust as a proxy of normlessness. We 
asked the respondents: “Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following 
statements.” We thereafter provided two statements to capture their perception of normlessness: 
“I trust the European Union” and “I trust the national government.” The response scale ranged 
from 1 “Strongly disagree” to 5 “Strongly agree.” The statements were inverted and thereafter 
YOUTH POLITICAL PASSIVITY IN THE EU 10 
 
averaged to create a normlessness scale (Pearson’s rrange = 0.35–0.79). For details on inter-item 
reliability, see Appendix 1, Table 6. 
Non-voting. We asked respondents to indicate whether or not they intend to vote in 
future: a) general elections, and b) the European parliament elections: “One of the ways in which 
people can express their opinion is by voting. Please indicate below the option that best describes 
you. Will you vote in the next national parliamentary elections/next European parliament 
elections?” There were three answers to choose among: 1 “Yes,” 2 “No,” and 3 “I don’t know 
yet.” Because we are foremost interested in why respondents abstain from voting, both variables 
were recoded so that the yes and the don’t-know option had the score 0 and the negative option 
the score 1. 
Unconventional political participation. This measure is an average of responses to three 
statements about involvement in unconventional political participation during the last 12 months. 
The stem question read: “People can express their opinions regarding important local, 
environmental or political issues. We do so by participating in different activities. Have you done 
any of the following in the past 12 months?” The statements are: “Painted or stuck political 
messages or graffiti on walls,” “Taken part in an occupation of a building or a public space,” and 
“Taken part in a political event where there was a physical confrontation with political opponents 
or with the police” (Cronbach’s αrange = 0.55–0.94). Respondents could answer 1 “No,” 2 
“Rarely,” 3 “Sometimes,” 4 “Often,” or 5 “Very often.” We recoded this measure so that 
involvement had the score 1 and non-involvement 0. 
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Strategy of Analysis 
 
We expect that young people’s non-voting, that is, their political passivity, will be connected to 
social, economic, and political characteristics of the eight EU countries under study. We 
therefore explored the political passivity of young people in the EU foremost through country- 
based analyses. First, we wanted to get a better understanding of our two explanatory factors. 
Hence, we started by examining levels of political apathy and alienation across the eight 
countries. We examined potential country differences using analyses of covariance (ANCOVAs) 
and independent samples t-tests.  Finally we used logistic regression analyses and 
complementary chi-square tests to examine the extent to which apathy and alienation explains 
youths’ political passivity and unconventional political participation. All our primary analyses 
were controlled for gender, immigrant status, and income. 
 
 
Results 
 
Political passivity across different contexts 
 
Table 1 shows the shares of young people in each country that report inclinations for a non-vote 
in upcoming national and EU elections. As can be seen from these results, youths in most of the 
eight countries harbor the same inclinations for a non-vote irrespective of if considering the 
national or the EU election. The exception is Greece, and to some extent the UK, where the 
share reporting that they will not vote in upcoming EU elections far exceeds the share reporting 
that they will abstain an upcoming vote in future national elections. 
Political apathy and alienation across different contexts 
 
The mean comparisons of Table 2 show that political apathy and alienation differs between the 
eight countries in the sample. With regard to political apathy, mean comparisons across the 
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countries show that political apathy reaches its peaks in Czech Republic and Italy, and its low in 
the UK. However, most countries in the study differ very little with regard to their level of 
political apathy. Only the UK stands out with significantly lower levels of political apathy 
compared to all other countries under study. 
With regard to political alienation, mean comparisons across the countries show that 
powerlessness reaches its peak in the Czech Republic and Greece, and its low in Sweden. We 
find also the lowest levels of normlessness in Sweden. Additionally, young people in Greece 
exceeds youths in all the other countries and come out as the single most alienated youth group 
with regard to normlessness. It is not easy to reach a clear conclusion with regard to comparisons 
of powerlessness and normlessness within the eight countries. In all but one country (Czech 
Republic), powerlessness and normlessness appears to reach different levels. However, four of 
the countries show significantly higher levels of powerlessness (Estonia, Germany, Portugal, and 
the UK) and three of the countries (Greece, Italy, and Sweden) show significantly higher levels 
of normlessness. 
Finally, using Pearson’s r, we also examined the extent to which the different forms of 
political apathy and alienation are associated. The results show that political apathy and 
alienation generally are related, although foremost to a weak extent (apathy – powerlessness: 
modal correlation = .12*** [lowest = .02; highest = .20***]; apathy – normlessness: modal 
correlation = .22*** [lowest = .10*; highest = .31***]). 
Explaining political passivity with political apathy and alienation 
 
We explored young people’s inclinations for non-voting in forthcoming general elections and 
European parliament elections. For both these outcomes, we tested four separate models by 
country: 1) a model including only controls, 2) an apathy model, 3) an alienation model, and 4) a 
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model including both apathy and alienation. We made use of a Wald test to compare the apathy 
and the alienation models with the control model respectively and then in the combined model, 
we compared the effect of apathy with the effects of alienation. Table 3 shows a summary of 
these results. Each column in the table specifies the model, for a specific country, that was best 
at explaining a certain outcome. In Czech Republic, for instance, Unconventional political 
participation (U) was best explained by the Control model, non-voting in the national election 
(N) was best explained by the Apathy model, and non-voting in the European parliament election 
 
(E) was best explained by the Combined model (see Appendix 1 for full model information). 
 
Concerning political passivity in general elections, the results show that the apathy model 
was the best at predicting non-voting in general elections in Czech Republic and Germany and 
that the combined model was the best in Estonia, Greece, and Italy. Moreover, political 
alienation was never a sole explanatory factor of intentions not to vote in forthcoming general 
elections. Stated differently, in the five countries where political apathy and alienation explained 
young people's intentions for non-voting in forthcoming general elections, political apathy was 
predicting non-voting equally well as, or better than, alienation. 
The analyses of young people’s inclinations for non-voting in European parliament 
elections showed similar results. That is, both political apathy and alienation explained non- 
voting in the EU election. In Portugal and the UK, positive effects from apathy and alienation 
were present but the effects were not significant, nor were they different in strength while 
controlled for each other in the combined model. Moreover, the roles of apathy and alienation 
was not decisive in Greece; the non-significant Wald test of Model 4 suggest that effects from 
both apathy and normlessness were present. However, the AIC and BIC indices suggest that the 
apathy model is best at explaining young Greeks’ non-voting in future EU elections. In the 
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remaining five countries, a non-vote in future EU elections was best explained by apathy and 
alienation, most often in the form of powerlessness. For these countries, the normlessness 
dimension of alienation had no significant impact on inclinations for non-voting in the EU 
election. In sum, irrespective of if focusing general or EU elections, there seems to exist country 
variations in the extent to which political apathy and alienation predicts non-voting. Notably, 
though, in instances where the two factors do predict inclinations of a non-vote, political apathy 
seems always to be present. 
From these analyses it seems that, compared with political alienation, apathy has a 
superior role in explaining political passivity. However, theory states that next to exiting, 
alienation may result in remedial action as well. Perhaps alienation takes its expression not as 
exiting (political passivity) but foremost as remedial action? To answer this question, we 
compared the effects of apathy and alienation on unconventional political participation in models 
equivalent to those for non-voting. In Czech Republic, Estonia, and Greece, the control model 
was the best at predicting unconventional political participation, indicating that political apathy 
and alienation have very limited roles in predicting unconventional political participation at all in 
some countries. The control model was also best for Italy but a closer look at Table 5c reveals a 
positive, significant effect of normlessness for unconventional political participation. In 
Germany, Sweden, and the UK, unconventional political participation was positively predicted 
by some form of alienation. Only in Portugal was unconventional political participation 
predicted positively by apathy. Hence, the analyses suggest that for unconventional political 
participation, alienation has a stronger role to play compared with apathy. 
So far, the analyses have enlightened us with several findings that can illuminate the 
political passivity of young European citizens. Nevertheless, when exploring non-votes in the 
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data we also wanted to examine more in depth the reasons underlying young people’s non- 
voting. Among youths expressing that they would not vote in upcoming elections (general or 
European parliament elections), respondents were asked also to report about the reasons for 
casting a non-vote. To take advantage of these data, we selected only non-voters for a final 
analysis. Given that this selection of only non-voters reduced the sample size considerably, we 
decided to conduct this part of the analysis on the whole sample. We thereafter compared non- 
voters expressing high levels of political apathy with non-voters expressing high levels of 
alienation (powerlessness) on: a) an indifferent attitude to elections, and b) a lack of valid 
options to vote for. The results showed that whereas apathetic youths showed to be more than 
twice as likely as alienated youths to answer “I don’t care” (p<0.001) as their reason not to vote, 
alienation youths were more than four times as likely to motivate their choice to abstain with the 
reason that “I don't think any candidates will represent my views” (p<0.001) (Table 4). These 
differences appeared irrespective of if the respondent was addressing an upcoming general or 
European parliament election. 
 
 
Discussion 
 
This study set out to examine if youths’ political passivity is better explained by political apathy 
or alienation. Our analyses point toward an answer suggesting that in terms of non-voting, 
political passivity is best explained by political apathy. Nevertheless, certain more nuanced 
patterns appeared from comparing across the contexts as well. 
First, irrespective of its underlying reason, this study suggests that political passivity – 
measured as future non-voting intentions – is present among youths in today’s EU. Second, 
whereas political apathy seems better at explaining political passivity than alienation, alienation 
YOUTH POLITICAL PASSIVITY IN THE EU 16 
 
appeared to be the strongest factor of the two when it came to unconventional political 
participation. As earlier studies suggest a similar outcome (e.g., Southwell & Everest, 1998), to 
find alienation more closely related to unconventional political participation was not a surprise. 
However, that political apathy seems better than alienation at explaining young people’s political 
passivity goes counter to what has been suggested previously (Henn et al., 2005). Noted should 
be that the presence of political apathy and alienation both challenges the overall participatory 
democratic ideal of an active citizenship.  This ideal is widely cherished and supported by the 
EU and their youth policies in particular (Amnå & Ivarsson, 2017).  However, while the 
apathetic stance of passivity needs to be recognized and better understood, the alienated 
orientation calls for an even wider concern by national as well as European political institutions. 
From the results of this study it seems that reasons underlying a non-vote corresponds 
effectively with a rational. It is clear that non-voters’ cognitive awareness about politics is a 
divider that distinguishes an apathetic non-vote from an alienated one: Some young people do 
not care enough about politics to partake through its representative channels, other youths abstain 
the vote because they possess the competence to evaluate the extent to which the act of voting is 
of any use to them. And, as it seems, alienated youths take to other means in order to influence 
public affairs. So, what we observe in this and other studies on political passivity is possibly a 
vicious circle. Compared with older generations’, young people’s interests are likely not 
represented to the same extent in the democratic decision-making process. And this, in turn, 
suggests that young people have the propensity to feel even more apathetic toward and alienated 
from public affairs. As more apathy and alienation seem linked to non-voting, the likelihood to 
remedy a non-representative assembly through means of increased participation is far away. 
Additionally, the electoral success of populist parties across European politics can be seen as a 
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failure of the established parties’ attempts to convince youths that political leaders listen and care 
about people like them. What might be able to turn this unwelcomed situation is that other 
political parties strengthen their position among youths. For one thing, political parties must try 
harder to find young people willing to run for political offices.  Such increasing attempts from 
the parties’ side might assure younger voters that their experiences and life-situations are taken 
into consideration when policies are developed. In other words, there is a need to deepen: “[T]he 
feeling that individual political action does have, or can have, an impact upon the political 
process, i.e. that it is worthwhile to perform one’s civic duties. It is the feeling that political and 
social change is possible, and that the individual citizen can play a part in bringing about this 
change” (Campbell et al., 1954, p. 187). 
A couple of limitations of the current study should also be mentioned. First, our outcome 
measure of political passivity was intentions (not) to vote.  Hence, to the extent that this study 
can further the knowledge on young people’s political passivity, such wisdom is based on 
respondents’ anticipations of their future intentions regarding voting in national and EU 
referendum. Naturally, such expectations carry with them a certain level of uncertainty and 
should thereby be interpreted with caution. Second, the country-level data collections carried out 
for this project were primarily conducted in schools in a none-representative manner. The extent 
to which the data equate with national averages on relevant factors therefore differs considerably 
between countries. Hence, readers should be careful when generalizing these data to other 
contexts and preferably, the findings of this study need to be replicated in representative samples 
in order to further their relevance. 
This study concludes that political passivity is very much a present political orientation of 
European youths. Passivity is not only present both as political apathy and alienation, it also 
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seem to have consequences for how young people express their political interest and behavior. 
What future studies on this topic should focus on, though, which was missing in this analysis, is 
to disentangle the extent to which politically apathetic individuals ignore politics because they 
are content with how society is functioning and with how the political system reaches, according 
to them, favorable outcomes (Amnå & Ekman, 2015; Rosenberg, 1954). Such an analysis should 
also be complemented with a more comprehensive understanding of how young people 
conceptualize politics.  Presently, research on young people’s understanding of politics is 
lacking. But we know from studies on adults that the conceptual breath of ‘what is political’ 
varies considerably and that different connotations also have different behavioral consequences 
(Fitzgerald, 2013). Hence, the meaning of young people’s political passivity and its 
consequences is still very much in need of further inquiry. 
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Table 1. 
 
Inclinations for non-voting in upcoming national and EU elections. Percentages. 
 
 Czech 
 
Republic 
Estonia Germany Greece Italy Portugal Sweden UK 
Non-voting in national elections 35.0 32.6 46.2 40.2 37.2 45.3 18.7 12.4 
Non-voting in EU elections 31.2 35.9 43.5 58.9 38.2 47.6 18.2 19.3 
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Table 2. 
 
Analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) of political passivity × country, controlling for gender, country of birth, and income. 
 
Czech 
 
Republic 
Estonia Germany Greece Italy Portugal Sweden UK F-values (d.f.) η2 
Apathy 3.33abc 3.18bcde 3.01def 2.97ef 3.29abcd 3.06cdef 3.21
abcde
 2.17
g
 88.42(7, 4120)*** 0.13 
 
Alienation 
        
Powerlessness 3.45a 3.37ab 3.21bc 3.43a 3.21bc 3.09c 2.74d 3.18bc 23.09(7, 4215)*** 0.04 
Normlessness 3.46b 3.02c 3.00c 3.78a 3.52b 2.99c 2.84c 2.96c 86.49(7, 4113)*** 0.13 
Mean difference test -0.01 0.35*** 0.21*** -0.35*** -0.32*** 0.12* -0.13** 0.21*** 
  
 
Note: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
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Table 3. 
 
Summary of best models for predicting inclinations for non-voting in forthcoming elections and unconventional political 
 
participation.  
 
 
Model 
Czech 
Republic 
 
 
Estonia 
 
 
Germany 
 
 
Greece 
 
 
Italy 
 
 
Portugal 
 
 
Sweden 
 
 
UK 
1. Control 
 
2. Apathy 
 
3. Alienation 
 
4. Combined 
U 
N 
 
 
E 
U 
 
 
 
 
NE 
 
 
N 
 
 
EU 
U 
E 
 
 
N 
U 
 
 
 
 
NE 
NE 
 
 
 
 
U 
N 
 
 
 
 
EU 
NE 
 
 
U 
 
Note: N = National election; E = European parliament election; U = Unconventional political participation. 
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Table 4. 
Reasons for non-voting in upcoming elections. Percentages. 
 
 Apathetic Alienated Chi2 (p-value) 
I don’t care n = 537 General elections 31.7 12.5 29.65 
     
(<0.001) 
 
n = 698 European parliament elections 22.7 11.9 11.33 
     
(<0.001) 
I don't think any candidates will n = 537 General elections 3.4 13.7 15.50 
represent my views 
    
(<0.001) 
 
n = 698 European parliament elections 4.2 11.9 14.46 
     
(<0.001) 
 
